Weapons changes
Shaka is often said to have been dissatisfied with the long throwing “assegai”, and credited with introducing a new variant of the weapon: the “iklwa”, a short stabbing spear with a long, sword-like spearhead.
Though Shaka probably did not invent the iklwa, according to Zulu scholar John Laband, the leader did insist that his warriors train with the weapon, which gave them a “terrifying advantage over opponents who clung to the traditional practice of throwing their spears and avoiding hand-to-hand conflict”. The throwing spear was not discarded but used as an initial missile weapon before close contact with the enemy, when the shorter stabbing spear was used in hand-to-hand combat.
Shaka is also supposed to have introduced a larger, heavier shield made of cowhide and to have taught each warrior how to use the shield’s left side to hook the enemy’s shield to the right, exposing his ribs for a fatal spear stab. In Shaka’s time, these cowhide shields were supplied by the king, and remained the king’s property. Different coloured shields distinguished different amabutho within Shaka’s army. Some had black shields, others used white shields with black spots, some had white shields with brown spots, while others used pure brown or white shields.
Mobility of the army
The story that sandals were discarded to toughen the feet of Zulu warriors has been noted in various military accounts such as The Washing of the Spears, Like Lions They Fought and Anatomy of the Zulu Army. Implementation was typically blunt. Those who objected to going without sandals were simply killed. Shaka drilled his troops frequently, forced marches sometimes covering more than 50 miles (80 km) a day in a fast trot over hot, rocky terrain. He also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics.
Historian John Laband dismisses these stories as myth. “What are we to make, then, of [European trader Henry Francis] Fynn’s statement that once the Zulu army reached hard and stony ground in 1826, Shaka ordered sandals of ox-hide to be made for himself?”
The idea of a 50 miles (80 km) march in a single day is also dismissed as ridiculous. Lab and further claims that even though these stories have been repeated by “astonished and admiring white commentators”, the Zulu army covered “no more than 12 miles a day, and usually went only about 8.7 miles”. Furthermore, Zulus under Shaka sometimes advanced more slowly. They spent two whole days recuperating in one instance, and on another they rested for a day and two nights before pursuing their enemy. Several other historians of the Zulu, and the Zulu military system however, affirm the mobility rate of up to 50 miles per day.
Logistic support by youths
Boys and girls aged six and over joined Shaka’s force as apprentice warriors (udibi) and served as carriers of rations, supplies like cooking pots and sleeping mats, and extra weapons until they joined the main ranks. It is sometimes held that such support was used more for very light forces designed to extract tribute in cattle and slaves from neighbouring groups. Nevertheless, the concept of “light” forces is questionable. The fast-moving Zulu raiding party or “ibutho lempi” on a mission invariably traveled light, driving cattle as provisions on the hoof, and were not weighed down with heavy weapons and supply packs. The herdboy logistic structure was deployed in support of these relatively short-term operations, and was easily adaptable to large or small expeditions.
The age-grade regimental system
Age-grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu culture of the day, and indeed are still important in much of Africa. Age grades were responsible for a variety of activities, from guarding the camp, to cattle herding, to certain rituals and ceremonies. Shaka organised various grades into regiments, and quartered them in special military kraals, with regiments having their own distinctive names and insignia. The regimental system clearly built on existing tribal cultural elements that could be adapted and shaped to fit an expansionist agenda.
The “bull horn” formation
Most historians credit Shaka with initial development of the famous “bull horn” formation”.It was composed of three elements:
- The main force, the “chest”, closed with the enemy Impi and pinned it in position. The warriors who comprised the “chest” were senior veterans.
- The “horns”, while the enemy Impi was pinned by the “chest”, would flank the Impi from both sides and encircle it; in conjunction with the “chest” they would then destroy the trapped force. The warriors who comprised the “horns” were young and fast juniors.
- The “loins”, a large reserve, was placed, seated, behind the “chest” with their backs to the battle. The “loins” would be committed wherever the enemy Impi threaten to break out of the encirclement.
Coordination was supplied by regimental “izinduna” (chiefs or leaders) who used hand signals and messengers. The scheme was elegant in its simplicity, and well understood by the warriors assigned to each echelon.
Organization and leadership of the Zulu forces
The hosts were generally partitioned into three levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and “armies” or bigger formations, although the Zulu did not use these terms in the modern sense. Any grouping of men on a mission could collectively be called an impi, whether a raiding party of 100 or a horde of 10,000. Numbers were not uniform, but dependent on a variety of factors including assignments by the king or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities. A regiment might be 400 or 4,000 men. These were grouped into corps that took their name from the military kraals where they were mustered, or sometimes the dominant regiment of that locality.
Shakan methods versus European technology
The expanding Zulu power inevitably clashed with European hegemony in the decades after Shaka’s death. In fact, European travellers to Shaka’s kingdom demonstrated advanced technology such as firearms and writing, but the Zulu monarch was less than convinced. There was no need to record messages, he held, since his messengers stood under penalty of death should they bear inaccurate tidings. As for firearms, Shaka acknowledged their utility as missile weapons after seeing muzzle-loaders demonstrated, but argued that in the time a gunman took to reload, he would be swamped by charging spear-wielding warriors.
The first major clash after Shaka’s death took place under his successor Dingane, against expanding European Voortrekkers from the Cape. Initial Zulu success rested on fast-moving surprise attacks and ambushes, but the Voortrekkers recovered and dealt the Zulu a severe defeat from their fortified wagon laager at theBattle of Blood River. The second major clash was against the British during 1879. Once again, most Zulu successes rested on their mobility, ability to screen their forces and to close when their opponents were unfavourably deployed. Their major victory at the Battle of Isandlwana is well known, but they also forced back a British column at the Battle of Hlobane mountain, by deploying fast-moving regiments over a wide area of rugged ravines and gullies, and attacking the British who were forced into a rapid disorderly fighting retreat, back to the town of Kambula.
Shaka as the creator of a revolutionary warfare style
A number of historians argue that Shaka ‘changed the nature of warfare in Southern Africa’ from ‘a ritualized exchange of taunts with minimal loss of life into a true method of subjugation by wholesale slaughter’. Others dispute this characterization (see Scholarship section below). A number of writers focus on Shaka’s military innovations such as the iklwa – the Zulu thrusting spear, and the “buffalo horns” formation. This combination has been compared to the standardization implemented by the reorganized Roman legions under Marius.